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ON OPIOIDS AND ERISA: THE URGENT CASE FOR A
FEDERAL BAN ON DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES
Katherine T. Vukadin *
ABSTRACT
The American opioid epidemic cuts across all social divisions,
touching the employed and unemployed. Those with private health
insurance are one of the fastest-growing affected groups, but this
group struggles most to get care. Despite their insured status, the
privately-insured received treatment at half the rate of those with
Medicaid and at even lower rates than the uninsured. This article
focuses on a significant barrier to treatment for those in employersponsored benefit plans: the discretionary clause. A discretionary
clause grants the decision maker broad latitude and ensures that
any federal court review is deferential. Claims processing in such
a legal climate is stingy; recent investigations show that mental
health and addiction claims are treated worst of all. Twenty-five
states recently banned discretionary clauses in insurance products, but the bans do not reach most ERISA plans.
This article posits that ERISA should be amended to ban discretionary clauses. The article explains ERISA and discretionary
clauses; it then shows the effect of discretionary clauses on actual
cases and claims processing, focusing on mental health and substance abuse. The article then explains the recent movement away
from discretionary clauses and shows why the arguments against
discretionary clauses apply with even greater force to ERISAgoverned plans.

* Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law; J.D., 1999, University of Texas School of Law; B.A., 1991, University of Houston.
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“The very existence of ‘rights’ under such plans depends on the
degree of discretion lodged in the [benefit plan] administrator.” 1
INTRODUCTION
The American opioid epidemic cuts across all social divisions,
touching the employed and unemployed. Those with private
health insurance are one of the fastest-growing affected groups,
but this group struggles most to get care. Of the 1.5 million people recently diagnosed with opioid use disorder, over forty percent
(or 622,000 people) had private health insurance. 2 Only twentyone percent of this group, however, received treatment. 3 In fact,
the privately insured received treatment at half the rate of those
with Medicaid and at even lower rates than the uninsured. 4 As
the number of opioid-related deaths only continues to grow, steps
to remove barriers to coverage for the privately insured should be
taken. 5
This article focuses on a significant barrier to treatment in employer-sponsored benefit plans: the discretionary clause. A discretionary clause lets claims reviewers interpret plan terms as they
wish; if the denied claim ends up in court, this clause lends the
denial a presumption of correctness. Particularly in complex mental health and substance abuse cases, a lengthy factual record,
laced with the opinions of plan physicians, tends to yield at least
a few facts supporting denial, even if the overall tenor of the
claim supports coverage. A review under this arbitrary and capri-

1. Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., 259 F.3d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 2001).
2. Stoddard Davenport & Katie Matthews, Opioid Use Disorder in the United States:
Diagnosed Prevalence by Payer, Age, Sex, and State, MILLIMAN 2 (Mar. 9, 2018), http://
www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2018/Opioid_Use_Disorder_Prevalence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37DT-PXJX].
3. Press Release, Kaiser Family Found., Nonelderly Adults with Opioid Addiction
Covered by Medicaid Were Twice as Likely as those with Private Insurance or the Uninsured to Have Received Treatment in 2016 (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid
/press-release/nonelderly-adults-with-opioid-addiction-covered-by-medicaid-were-twice-aslikely-as-those-with-private-insurance-or-the-uninsured-to-have-received-treatment-in-20
16/ [https://perma.cc/4PYF-7M9J].
4. Id.
5. Puja Seth et al., Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and Psychostimulants—United States, 2015–2016, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 349, 349 (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/pdfs/mm6712a1-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9BTWSXC] (stating that opioids were involved in 33,091 deaths in 2015, increasing to 42,249
deaths in 2016).
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cious standard is not concerned with the “right” decision on a
claim—the question is whether the denial before the court is remotely defensible or not. The discretionary clause thus works
against the plan participant, allowing the plan’s version of terms
and events to prevail and expensive addiction treatment to remain out of reach.
Twenty-five states recently banned discretionary clauses in insurance products, 6 but the bans’ effects on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) plans are uneven.
The state law bans reach insured ERISA plans (plans that use insurance to pay their claims), which remain subject to state oversight. The bans do not, however, reach self-funded ERISA plans,
which pay their own claims and thus are not deemed insurance
products. These widely used employer-sponsored plans therefore
remain immune to this and other state law, existing in a largely
regulation-free zone. About seventy-three million Americans have
coverage through such self-insured plans. 7
Discretionary clauses have been criticized since their rise in
the 1990s, but the current opioid crisis only heightens the urgent
need for a clear path to opioid abuse treatment through contracted benefits. Discretionary clauses should therefore be banned in
insured and self-funded ERISA plans alike by means of federal
law.
This article makes the case for an amendment to ERISA that
would prohibit discretionary clauses. Part I provides necessary
background information on ERISA and the rise of discretionary
clauses. Part II shows the effect of discretionary clauses on actual
cases and the claims processing climate, focusing on mental
health and substance abuse. Part III explains the recent movement away from discretionary clauses, and shows why the arguments against discretionary clauses apply with even greater force
with regard to ERISA-governed plans.
I. BACKGROUND ON ERISA AND DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES
In the debate in the United States over health insurance, those
with employer-sponsored coverage are counted among the fortu6. Owens v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 184 F. Supp. 3d 580, 584 (W.D. Ky. 2016).
7. John Blum, The Role of ERISA in Healthcare Reform, Payors, Plans & Managed
Care Law Institute, 2009 AHLA SEMINAR PAPERS (Oct. 26, 2009).
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nate. About 157 million Americans are covered through an employer. 8 These employer-sponsored benefits, however, come with
an important caveat: those that are self-funded (that pay their
own claims) are governed not by the state laws that traditionally
govern insurance but by a federal law, ERISA. 9 This groundbreaking law set out to ensure the security of pension benefits at
a time when pensions were frequently ending up underfunded; 10
by most accounts, ERISA has, for the most part, accomplished
this mission. 11 When it comes to other welfare plans, such as
health and disability benefits, however, its effects have been
mixed.
ERISA begins by imposing fiduciary duties on plan decisionmakers. 12 But without more, these duties—described as the highest in law 13—are insufficient when the fiduciary’s decisions are
assumed to be correct, and even serious errors just result in a doover for the plan. 14
A. ERISA Imposes Fiduciary Duties
ERISA decision makers are bound by the duty of loyalty, the
exclusive benefit rule, the duty of care, the duty to diversify investments, and the duty to follow plan terms so far as they are
consistent with ERISA. 15 These are duties derived from the law of
8. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, State Health Facts, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ [https://perma.
cc/7LK5-J3NQ] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (follow “Data View: Number”).
9. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–461 and in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
10. See, e.g., JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 271 (2004).
11. Id. at 281.
12. George L. Flint, The Moench Presumption: Butchering ERISA, 59 WAYNE L. REV.
461, 461 (2013).
13. “‘ERISA’s duty of loyalty is the highest known to the law.’ ERISA fiduciaries must
‘discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries.’” Singh v. RadioShack Corp., 882 F.3d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration in
original) (footnote omitted).
14. See Flint, supra note 12, at 462–64.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012).
ERISA imposes “higher-than-marketplace quality standards” on plan administrators and requires them to “discharge [their] duties . . . solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries” of the plan. And “[w]hile
a fiduciary has a duty to protect the plan’s assets against spurious claims, it
also has a duty to see that those entitled to benefits receive them. It must
consider the interests of deserving beneficiaries as it would its own.” Moreo-
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trusts, which provides much of ERISA’s underpinning. 16 Trust
law does not provide every answer, however, and the rules of
ERISA and caselaw fill in the gaps, “partly reflect[ing] a congressional determination that the common law of trusts did not offer
completely satisfactory protection.” 17
The same person or committee that serves in a fiduciary capacity can still hold a nonfiduciary (known as “settlor”) role. 18 Settlor
functions are generally those concerning “the establishment, termination and design of plans.” 19 Thus, a fiduciary can design a
plan, while wearing its settlor rather than fiduciary hat, in a way
that undermines the protections that ERISA provides. 20 That is,
in deciding a plan participant’s entitlement to benefits, a decision
maker is bound by fiduciary duties to decide issues in the participant’s interest. 21 Yet, even if that same decision maker also acts
as the plan sponsor, the decision maker can wear a settlor hat
and weaken participant rights by adding a discretionary clause to
the plan. In this fashion, the claims administrator can make decisions that follow the plan rules, even though the same entity tilted the plan in its own favor when wearing the settlor hat.
ver, the claims process through which a plan administrator determines a
beneficiary’s eligibility for benefits is not designed to be adversarial. “Indeed,
one purpose of ERISA was to provide a nonadversarial method of claims settlement.”
Joseph F. v. Sinclair Servs. Co., 158 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1253 (D. Utah 2016) (alterations in
original) (footnotes omitted).
16. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).
17. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996). Trust law is just a starting point,
and courts must then determine how the statute and trust law should work together. Id.
In so doing, courts should
take account of competing congressional purposes, such as Congress’ desire to
offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and,
on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.
Id.
18. See Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of
the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 490 (2015) (citing Varity
Corp., 516 U.S. at 503).
19. Information Letter from Dennis M. Kass, Assistant Sec’y, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to John N. Erlenborn (Mar. 13, 1986), https://www.dol.gov/agen
cies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/information-letters/03-13-1986 [https://perma.
cc/9BVV-KH9X]. For a detailed discussion of the development of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, see Muir & Stein, supra note 18, at 478–84.
20. Muir & Stein, supra note 18, at 464 (“[T]he settlor/fiduciary doctrine can allow
employers to design plans to permit fiduciary behavior that would be flatly impermissible
if not expressly provided by the plan’s terms.”).
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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The addition of a discretionary clause, as explained below,
gives the fiduciary’s decisions a “presumption of correctness,”
thereby giving fiduciaries wide latitude in their decision making. 22 As explained in more detail below, such a clause effectively
allows fiduciaries deciding claims to “do as they please[] rather
than concern themselves with any standard imposed by
ERISA.” 23
The fiduciary/settlor distinction also allows the plan sponsor to
design a plan that undermines statutory requirements in numerous other ways. 24 Thus, while ERISA’s fiduciary duties are significant, the donning of the settlor hat permits plan designers to set
up a plan framework with features such as a discretionary clause,
that undermine the very purpose of ERISA in promoting the receipt of contracted benefits.
B. State Laws Preempted
In addition to imposing fiduciary duties, ERISA preempts most
state laws and claims, replacing them with few federal equivalents. 25 ERISA is thus a shield against liability for improper
claims processing and against state law consumer protections,
such as discretionary clause bans. Indeed, ERISA functions as a
near-complete limitation on recovery available to plaintiffs: “For
the vast majority of privately insured Americans who might
choose to file lawsuits, ERISA is the main difference between a
dismissal and a generous award or settlement.” 26
The reason for this gap is that American health insurance has
evolved into a patchwork of state and federal policies and programs, with both public and private coverage—ERISA provides
only a sparse framework for governing health, disability, and other employer-sponsored benefit plans. 27 The Affordable Care Act
22. Flint, supra note 12, at 463.
23. Id. at 462.
24. Muir & Stein, supra note 18, at 522–28 (describing how plan design can undermine ERISA goals such as ready access to the federal courts and judicial review, and how
plan design can also bypass crucial plan requirements such as the rule that a plan’s terms
be written down).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
26. William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit,
and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 614 (2003).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) allows a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action
“(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
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(“ACA”) has added a layer of federal requirements and protections to state-regulated plans, 28 while also amending ERISA to
add consumer protections and the mandatory availability of independent review for denied claims. 29
The states, however, remain the principal regulators of insurance, through the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 30 Policies governed by
state law are thus subject to a host of state laws and state claims,
such as tort law, if the policy does not pay out when it should. 31
But ERISA’s broad preemption provisions make these same remedies unavailable to those covered by ERISA plans. Enacted in an
era when most individuals received health insurance from plans
that were regulated by state laws, 32 ERISA ensured that insurance contracts remained subject to state regulation. 33 The drafters could scarcely have predicted, however, how the broad
preemption provision would go on to combine with other ERISA
provisions to create a regulatory vacuum.
ERISA preemption begins with a broad provision that
preempts all state laws touching ERISA plans: ERISA “supercede[s] any and all [s]tate laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 34 ERISA preemption is
interpreted broadly. 35 But another clause saves from preemption
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
28. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119, 163–64 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012 & Supp. 2018))
(establishing the essential health benefits package for any health plan).
29. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed into law on March 23,
2010. Id. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 was signed into law
on March 30, 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. These two bills will be referred to
as the Affordable Care Act in this article.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-510 (2014).
32. ERISA Preemption: Remedies for Denied or Delayed Health Claims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Dep’t of Labor, Health & Human Servs. & Educ. & Related Agencies
of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 8 (1999) [hereinafter ERISA Preemption
Hearing] (statement of Olena Berg, Assistant Sec’y, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin.);
see WOOTEN, supra note 10, at 281–82. Before ERISA, pension terms were left largely to
the contracting parties, and many pensions came up short after employees had already
spent decades with their employer. After several high-profile pension collapses, public
opinion swayed toward a desire for reform. See, e.g., WOOTEN, supra, at 51 (discussing the
Studebaker Corporation shutdown).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2012); ERISA Preemption Hearing, supra note 32, at 8–
9.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
35. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98–99 (1983) (noting that the
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those state laws that regulate insurance. That is, ERISA saves
from preemption “any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” 36 So although ERISA preempts a
large swath of state laws, its “saving clause then reclaims a substantial amount of ground.” 37 Certain ERISA plans, therefore,
remain subject to state laws that govern insurance.
One category of ERISA plans, however, is completely immune
to state regulation; the difference turns on how claims within that
plan are funded and paid. That is, if a plan pays claims directly
from its own funds rather than from an insurance policy, it is
considered a “self-funded” plan. 38 These plans usually hire a
third-party administrator to review claims and decide which ones
should be paid; the money paid to healthcare providers comes
from the employer itself. 39 The employer can purchase stop-loss
insurance, which protects the employer from unusually large
claims, and still be considered self-funded. 40
Self-funded plans are not considered to be insurance, according
to ERISA’s “deemer” clause. 41 Thus, although state laws that are
directed toward the insurance industry are not preempted, those
laws still cannot touch self-funded ERISA plans. 42 This regulation-free environment benefits companies sponsoring benefit
plans in multiple ways. First, employers can design plans that
are uniform across multiple states—although the insurance laws
preemption clause is to be broadly read); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 523 (1981) (stating that Congress “meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern”).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2012).
37. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 364 (2002). “Except as provided in [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(A) (2012).
38. David Goldin, External Review Process Options for Self-Funded Health Insurance
Plans, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 440.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 441.
We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state
laws that “regulat[e] insurance” within the meaning of the saving clause. By
forbidding States to deem employee benefit plans “to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance”’ the
deemer clause relieves plans from state laws “purporting to regulate insurance.” As a result, self-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulation
insofar as that regulation “relate[s] to” the plans.
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (alterations in original).
42. Goldin, supra note 38, at 441.
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in various states might differ, the plans are untouched by those
laws and can therefore have a uniform plan design. 43 In addition,
ERISA imposes few substantive regulations, so that employers
offering these plans can design them as they please and offer the
precise options that they wish to offer and pay for. 44 Once employers realized the advantages of funding their own plans and
benefitting from this regulatory safe harbor, the number of selffunded plans increased dramatically. 45
Not only are state laws preempted, but state claims are too. So,
if a person covered under an ERISA plan has a claim improperly
denied, that person’s relief is limited to the benefit that should
have been paid. 46 More often, however, the claim is simply remanded to the administrator to conduct the proper review that it
should have undertaken the first time. 47 Judges have for years
decried the lack of remedies for improper claims processing, frustrated that the law provides no recourse or incentive to comply. 48
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Sixty-one percent of covered workers are in a self-funded plan, similar to
the percentage reported in 2012 . . . . The percentage of covered workers who
are in a plan that is completely or partially self-funded has increased over time
from 49% in 2000 to 54% in 2005 and to 59% in 2010.
THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2013 ANNUAL SURVEY 176 (2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2013/08/8465-employer-health-benefits-20132.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7XU-F54Z].
46. See, e.g., Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th
Cir. 2007) (holding that the attorney’s fee issue was not ripe until after plan administrator’s review on remand); Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 161 F.3d 472, 479 (7th
Cir. 1998) (affirming lower court’s holding that defendant did not complete a proper vocational review and that denial of disability benefits was arbitrary and capricious but reversing fee award because defendant’s decision was not “totally lacking in justification”); St.
Joseph’s Hosp. of Marshfield, Inc. v. Carl Klemm, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 824, 834 (W.D.
Wis. 2006) (denying motion for attorney’s fees because the defendant was not “simply out
to harass” plan participant).
47. See, e.g., Lafleur v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 563 F.3d 148, 157 (5th Cir.
2009) (explaining that remand is the usual solution when an administrator does not complete a proper claims review).
48. See, e.g., Gatlin v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 16 F. App’x 283, 290 (6th Cir.
2001) (“[A] stiffer penalty encourages plan administrators to alter their behavior with respect to employee appeals . . . .”); Perrin v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 06-182-JBC, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53065, at *11 (E.D. Ky. July 7, 2008) (“[T]he defendant will take a closer
look at the administrative record and its denial decisions if it is faced with more than the
prospect of merely reinstating benefits.”); Elliott v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 04-174-DLB,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38893, at *9–10 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007) (“Companies would likely
take a much closer look at denial decisions, and the presentation of that decision, if forced
to take into account the possibility that fees will be awarded . . . .”); Powell v. Premier Mfg.
Support Servs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 01-05-0012, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36105, at *28 (M.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2006) (“A fee award serves as a deterrent to conclusory statements that are
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Other state laws and claims affecting ERISA plans are generally
preempted. 49 ERISA cases do not qualify for a jury trial, and
plaintiffs are limited to those remedies set out in ERISA; no consequential, noneconomic, or punitive damages are available. 50
Nor do violations of ERISA’s claims regulations result in any substantive remedy, even when plaintiffs must sue to obtain the benefits they should have received. 51
As compared to their counterparts insured under non-ERISA
plans, those insured under ERISA plans find their litigation options limited. 52
devoid of specific and fact-supported reasons for denial of benefits.”).
49. Rahda A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA Preemption, 56 S.D. L.
REV. 500, 501 (2011) (noting that “the [Supreme] Court has been resistant to state efforts
to enforce historically available remedies for behavior that is now regulated by ERISA”);
see also Hatfield v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d. 24, 38, 43 (D.
Mass. 2016) (remanding the claim for full and fair review after the defendant told the insured the wrong reason for denial, gave nonspecific reasons for denial, and failed to gather
necessary information to make a decision).
50. John Morrison & John McDonald, Exorcising Discretion: The Death of Caprice in
ERISA Claims Handling, 56 S.D. L. REV. 482, 484 (2011) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006)).
51. See, e.g., Lafleur, 563 F.3d at 157 (“[F]ailure to fulfill procedural requirements
generally does not give rise to a substantive damage remedy.” (quoting Wade v. HewlettPackard Dev. Co., 493 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2007))); Bard v. Bos. Shipping Ass’n, 471
F.3d 229, 244–46 (1st Cir. 2006) (striking defendant’s evidence and awarding benefits
where procedural violations were “serious, had a connection to the substantive decision
reached, and call[ed] into question the integrity of the benefits-denial decision itself”);
Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 971 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that disregard of claims regulations leads to no substantive remedy); Schoedinger v. United
Healthcare, No. 4:04-cv-664 SNL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80956, at *25 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 6,
2006) (awarding attorney’s fees and noting: “[w]hether it be purposeful or negligent, insurance companies regularly reduce and deny claims without cause, thereby increasing
the cost of healthcare to providers and patients alike. If it became cost prohibitive for insurance companies to engage in this behavior, it would incentivize more accurate claims
administration and processing in the future”); Duncan v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc.,
No. CIV.A. 3:03-CV-1931N, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1975, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2005)
(noting that there is no substantive remedy for procedural violations).
52. Section 514 preemption of state law, and, therefore, state remedies, leave
ERISA’s section 502(a) civil enforcement scheme as the sole avenue of relief for
negligent medical necessity and other benefits determinations. Appropriate relief would normally be found by filing a state tort claim for monetary damages,
but under section 514, this is no longer possible since state tort or legislative relief would not be saved as limited to the business of insurance. Yet, section 502
only permits equitable relief for obtaining benefits that have been denied or delayed. Ex ante, this can require a patient to pursue the plan’s administrative
appeals process and/or retain an attorney and seek preliminary injunctive relief
while in the midst of a health crisis – a daunting process even for healthy
claimants.
Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, Drawing Lines in Shifting Sands: The U.S. Supreme Court’s
Mixed Messages on ERISA Preemption Imperil Health Care Reform, 36 J. LEGIS. 91, 97
(2010) (footnote omitted).
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C. Discretionary Clauses Creep In
Since 1989, ERISA plans have benefitted from still another
layer of insulation against claims-related liability—the discretionary clause. 53 A discretionary clause allows an ERISA claims
administrator or other decision maker to interpret the plan and
its terms as the administrator sees fit. A discretionary clause
“purport[s] to reserve discretion to the insurer to interpret the
terms of the contract.” 54 This clause is found nowhere in ERISA,
which does not mention a judicial standard of review for denied
claims. The Supreme Court addressed such clauses in the landmark case of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch. 55 In that case,
the Court searched for a default standard of review in claims cases, then found that there was no reason to depart from a de novo
standard of review. 56 The default standard would be de novo, the
Court explained, unless the plan contained a clause conferring
discretion upon the administrator. 57 If the plan contained such a
clause, the standard of review in federal court would be the arbitrary or capricious standard. 58 The standard of review, therefore,
is not required by ERISA or caselaw, but is a matter of plan design. 59

53.
54.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
See, e.g., PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES MODEL ACT § 4(B)
(MODEL REGULATION SERV. 2006), https://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-42.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/XVB3-KF4T].
55. 489 U.S. at 115.
56. Id. at 114–15.
57. Id. at 115; see also Fendler v. CNA Grp. Life Assurance Co., 247 F. App’x 754, 758
(6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115) (noting that where “‘the benefit plan
gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan,’ courts apply an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review”); Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir.
1996). In order for a court to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard, the grant of discretion to the administrator must be clear. Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 555
(6th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
58. Fendler, 257 F. App’x at 758.
59. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 385–86 (2002) (“Not only is
there no ERISA provision directly providing a lenient standard for judicial review of benefit denials, but there is no requirement necessarily entailing such an effect even indirectly.
When this Court dealt with the review standards on which the statute was silent, we held
that a general or default rule of de novo review could be replaced by deferential review if
the ERISA plan itself provided that the plan’s benefit determinations were matters of high
or unfettered discretion . . . . Nothing in ERISA, however, requires that these kinds of decisions by so ‘discretionary’ in the first place; whether they are is simply a matter of plan
design or the drafting of an HMO contract.”).
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The decision seemed to be an invitation to add a clause and
avoid de novo review, and employers quickly accepted. 60 Today,
discretionary clauses are ubiquitous in ERISA plans. 61 Discretionary clauses proliferated in non-ERISA insurance products too,
but, as explained below, state insurance officials are acting to ban
the clauses.
When a claim is denied under an ERISA plan, the beneficiary
can seek review within the plan, then external review. 62 The participant can then seek redress in federal court pursuant to ERISA
remedies. But, as described below, a denial from a plan with a
discretionary clause will—in all but the most egregious cases—be
affirmed.
II. DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES CHANGE OUTCOMES IN COURT AND
INFLUENCE CLAIMS PROCESSING PROCEDURES; MENTAL HEALTH
CLAIMS ARE HIT HARDEST
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a denial is affirmed unless the decision was “whimsical, random, or unreasoned.” 63 Claims processing outcomes reflect this state of affairs,
with scandal after scandal showing that lenient review at the
60. Professor John Langbein predicted this effect. “The Court’s emphasis . . . on the
trust instrument as the basis for deferential review raises the prospect that an ERISA
plan may opt out of [Firestone’s] de novo review and back into the pre-[Firestone] world of
judicial deference merely by inserting some boilerplate to that effect in the plan instrument.” John Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 220
(1990). Discretionary clauses increased in popularity during the 1990s, following the Firestone decision. Morrison & McDonald, supra note 50, at 482–84; see also Shawn McDermott, CRS § 10-3-1116, ERISA Preemption, and the Standard of Review, COLO. LAW., July
2010, at 75.
61. See, e.g., Morrison & McDonald, supra note 50, at 482.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2012). Every benefit plan must “provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to
be understood by the participant,” and “afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant
whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate
named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.” Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f) (2012).
For description of external review, see 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T(a)(2)(iv) (temporary regulations that expire on July 22, 2013, according to 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T(h)); 26
C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719 (“interim final regulations” with no stated expiration date according
to 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719(h)); Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Affordable Care Act Implementation FAQs Part I, U.S. DEP’T LAB. 1, 3–4 (Sept. 20, 2010), https://www.dol.gov/sites/
default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/aca-part-i.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/XN5M-HYPZ]; Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Technical Releases, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/technical-releases/1101 [https://perma.cc/N5QE-VFNG].
63. Teskey v. M.P. Metal Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1986).
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federal court level means that aggressive claims processing is the
order of the day. Mental health claims, with their often-complex
and fact-intensive records, are particularly vulnerable.
A. An Undemanding Review of Denials
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the decision need not be the same decision that the court would have
made, or even the right decision. 64 Indeed, some courts using this
standard hardly question the claims administrator’s decision at
all. 65 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that “review of
the administrator’s decision need not be particularly complex or
technical; it need only assure that the administrator’s decision
falls somewhere on a continuum of reasonableness—even if on
the low end.” 66 In one case involving ERISA plan benefits, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals described the low bar for arbitrary and capricious review:
Although it is an overstatement to say that a decision is not arbitrary or capricious whenever a court can review the reasons stated
for the decision without a loud guffaw, it is not much of an overstatement. The arbitrary or capricious standard is the least demanding form of judicial review . . . . 67

A denial challenged in federal court is thus presumed to be correct unless the plaintiff can somehow overcome the presumption. 68
In addition to serving as an undemanding lens for claim denials, the arbitrary and capricious standard also cuts off discovery,
so that the court does not view evidence beyond the existing claim
64. “Under this deferential standard, a plan administrator’s decision ‘will not be disturbed if reasonable.’” Stephan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 697 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir.
2012) (quoting Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 521 (2010)). “This reasonableness
standard requires deference to the administrator’s benefits decision unless it is ‘(1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts
in the record.’” Id. (quoting Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666,
676 (9th Cir. 2011)).
65. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emps.’ Pension Tr., 836 F.2d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 1987);
Graham v. L & B Realty Advisors, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:02CV0293–N, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17272, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2003) (“Although there is clear evidence to the contrary,
the Court, with some reluctance, acknowledges some concrete evidence supporting Unum’s
decision.”).
66. Corry v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 499 F.3d 389, 398 (5th Cir. 2007).
67. Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985).
68. See, e.g., Lipker v. AK Steel Corp., 698 F.3d 923, 928 (6th Cir. 2012); Viera v. Life
Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 407, 413–14 (3rd Cir. 2011).
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record. 69 This lenient standard for judicial review is understandably a feature that insurance plans have grown to “highly
prize[].” 70
B. Fertile Ground for Improper Denials
In this legal climate, claims processing predictably grew to reflect the deferential review that denials would receive in court. In
the early 2000s, an in-depth investigation of Unum/Provident
Corporation (“Unum”), one of America’s largest disability insurance companies, revealed the kind of claims processing that flourishes within the protective umbrella of discretionary clauses. 71
The respected National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(“NAIC”) noted that Unum’s claims processing practices were well
known as aggressive, but an investigation revealed much worse:
“selective review of the administrative record, lack of objectivity,
abuse of discretion, misuse of ambiguous test results, and claims
evaluation practices that defied common sense and bordered on
outright fraud.” 72
The NAIC views these practices not as those of a rogue actor,
but as an illustration of the kind of practices that thrive under
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard’s protective umbrella. 73 Indeed, the Unum investigation uncovered an internal memorandum linking its view of claims processing directly to ERISA and
its lenient standards. 74 In that memo, an Unum employee explicitly cited the deferential review in court and noted the many advantages of ERISA that “may influence our course of action”
when working within the “gray areas” of claims processing. 75 The
69. See, e.g., JO-EL MEYER & MARK DEBOFSKY, DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES IN ERISA
HEALTH & DISABILITY PLANS—ARE THEY STILL VIABLE? 1, 3 (2015), https://www.debofsky.
com/What-s-New/Discretionary-Clauses-in-ERISA-Health-and-Disability-Plans-Are-TheyStill-Viable.pdf [https://perma.cc/QKP7-5B8Z] (stating that the arbitrary and capricious
standard precludes normal trial practices, such as discovery).
70. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 384 (2002).
71. Brief for National Association of Insurance Commissioners as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee at 19, Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2009) (No.
08-35246).
72. Id. at 19–20.
73. Id. at 16.
74. Id. at 22.
75. Id. at 23 (citing Mark D. DeBofsky, Disability Insurance Under the ERISA Law:
Economic Security or Litigation Nightmare, 25 J. INS. REG. 33, 37–38 (2007)). The internal
memorandum noted:
The advantages of ERISA coverage in litigious situations are enormous: state
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Unum investigation ended in heavy fines and agreements to reassess a number of claim denials. 76
Courts too have observed that the claims processing incentives
are quite different once a deferential standard of review applies:
When presented with a benefits claim, the administrator is aware of
the risk that his decision may be subject to judicial review. The administrator has an incentive to avoid intense scrutiny by the courts
(such processes can be costly and time-consuming) and is, therefore,
more likely to choose an interpretation that will be favored by the
reviewing court . . . . Administrators whose decisions are subject to
only deferential review . . . are not as constrained by the possibility of judicial review. 77

Indeed, the improper addition of a discretionary clause to an
ERISA plan was considered a harm to a plaintiff such that it
would support standing in federal court. 78 The addition of such a
clause, the court held, was a significant shift in risk toward the
insured and away from the plan. 79
For any benefit claim, therefore, the presence of a discretionary
clause is significant. Recent events show, however, that the
harms are only exacerbated for mental health and particularly
addiction claims.
C. Mental Health and Substance Abuse Claims Are Hard Hit
Today, the Unum scandal is old news, but a new victim of discretionary clauses has emerged: mental health and addiction
claimants.
law is preempted by federal law, there are no jury trials, there are no compensatory or punitive damages, relief is usually limited to the amount of benefit in question, and claims administrators may receive a deferential standard of review.
Memorandum from Jeff McCall to Glenn Felton, IDC Mgmt. Grp. (Oct. 2, 1995), http://
www.erisa-claims.com/library/Provident%20memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXK6-7KPF].
76. Press Release, N.Y Att’y Gen. Press Office, Spitzer and Serio Announce Settlement with Nation’s Largest Disability Insurer (Nov. 18, 2004), https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/spitzer-and-serio-announce-settlement-nations-largest-disability-insurer [https://
perma.cc/XBR8-TRAU] (announcing a settlement with Unum and requiring it and five of
its subsidiaries to reassess about 200,000 previously denied claims, restructure the claim
procedures to increase objectivity and fairness, and pay a $15 million fine).
77. Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., 259 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2001).
78. Id. at 887–90 (reversing dismissal for lack of standing, and explaining that the
insertion of a discretionary clause was a considerable transfer of risk toward the insured
and a change to the rights of the insured).
79. Id. at 888, 890.
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Parity laws 80 (the “Parity Law”) require that mental health and
addiction claims be treated just the same as medical claims, but
mental health and addiction claims are still denied at much
greater rates than medical claims. 81 One reason is that Parity
Law violations are all too common, with more stringent utilization review and requirements imposed on mental health and particularly addiction claims. 82 Another, though, is that mental
80. The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (“MHPA”) and the Paul Welstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPAEA”) require the
financial requirements and treatment limitations for mental health and substance abuse
benefits be no more restrictive than the financial requirements and treatment limitations
for substantially all benefits for medical and surgical treatments. Mental Health Parity
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 701–02, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944–45, amended by Paul
Welstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 511–12, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
1185a (2012)). “‘[T]reatment limitations’ includes, limits on the frequency of treatment,
number of visits, days of coverage, or other similar limits on the scope or duration of
treatment.” Paul Welstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
Act § 512(a)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2012). The MHPAEA provides
that: (1) the treatment limitations applicable to mental-health benefits are no more restrictive than the predominant treatment limitations applied to substantially all medical
and surgical benefits (non-mental health benefits) covered by the plan (or coverage); and
(2) there are no separate treatment limitations that are applicable only with respect to
[mental health benefits]. Id. (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012)); see also
Baudoin v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of La., No. 6:12-00657, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47613, at
*12–13 (W.D. La. Mar. 21, 2018) (finding that a health care plan did not impose greater
restrictions on mental health and substance abuse treatment than it did on other medical
care where the plan requires all types of inpatient treatment to be medically necessary in
order to obtain coverage).
81. Jessica Frenkel, With Great Power Comes No Responsibility: The Tragedy & the
Irony of ERISA Preemption, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1188–89, 1191 (2017).
82. Despite the Parity Law, investigators have found payors limiting mental health
and addiction claims by illegally imposing more stringent rules on mental health and addiction treatments. See, e.g., Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Fact Sheet: FY 2017 MPAEA Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-act
ivities/resource-center/fact-sheets/mhpaea-enforcement-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SGWSZ2H] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). The fact sheet describes numerous enforcement actions
that uncovered illegal limits on mental health and addiction treatments, some from America’s largest health insurers. For example, investigators described one plan that impermissibly imposed day limits:
The Los Angeles Regional Office uncovered a plan that imposed an impermissible annual day limit on residential treatment for substance use disorders.
As a result of this investigation, the plan issued a special notice to all participants notifying them of a 30-calendar day window for submission of claims
affected by the previous limitation on their substance use disorder benefits.
Four claims, with billed amounts totaling $74,165, were submitted, reprocessed and paid by the plan. The plan also revised its documents to remove
the impermissible limitation for future plan years.
Id. at 3. Investigations over just one year revealed violations that disadvantaged mental
health and addiction treatment in the following ways: higher co-pays, concurrent reviews
that were not imposed on medical treatments, overly stringent precertification requirements, and limitations on stays for mental health and addiction treatment. Id. at 3–4. In
particular, the ValueOptions settlement agreement with the State of New York Attorney
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health and addiction claims are vulnerable to denial due to their
complicated factual records and the murky application of most
plans’ “medical necessity” requirement. 83
Recent investigations show just how badly mental health
claimants are treated. At ValueOptions (now known as Beacon
Health Strategies), the administrator of behavioral claims for forty-five million people in all fifty states, an investigation revealed
that mental health claims were denied at twice the rate of medical claims. 84 Substance abuse disorder claims were hit hardest,
denied nearly four times as often as those for medical and surgical claims. 85
Utilization review for behavioral health claims is more stringent than for medical claims. 86 For any claim, whether for mental
health or medical/surgical care, the approval process can be bewildering. 87 In the ValueOptions settlement, utilization review of
mental health claims is described as even worse: “intensive and
frequent”: “providers and members must spend a great deal of
time justifying each day or visit.” 88 As part of the settlement
General showed that addiction-only cases were treated even worse than alreadydisadvantaged mental health claims. ValueOptions, Inc., Assurance No. 14-176 (Mar. 4,
2015), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/ValueOptionsAOD-FullyExecuted.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2
CK-9MTE].
83. Frenkel, supra note 81, at 1190–95 (“The mentally ill are targets for [denial of
benefits] in part because there is far more uncertainty regarding diagnosis criteria and
treatment effectiveness for behavioral conditions than for most physical conditions.”).
84. This was the conclusion of an extensive investigation by the New York State Attorney General. Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen. Press Office, A.G. Schneiderman Announces Settlement with ValueOptions to End Wrongful Denial of Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Treatment Services (Mar. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Press Release, ValueOptions], https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-valueoption
s-end-wrongful-denial-mental-health [https://perma.cc/Q6U6-2XK5] (describing a settlement between the attorney general’s office and Beacon Health Options, formerly ValueOptions, requiring the managed care company to dramatically reform its claims review process and pay a $900,000 penalty).
85. Id.
86. Frenkel, supra note 81, at 1189, 1193 (stating that psychiatrists were more than
twice as likely than primary care doctors to experience strict utilization reviews and to
compromise on treatment because of this (citing Mark Schlesinger et al., Some Distinctive
Features of the Impact of Managed Care on Psychiatry, 8 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 216, 224
(2000)).
87. Sage, supra note 26, at 629 (“[T]he experience of requesting coverage of a proposed
treatment, receiving a response, and negotiating or formally appealing an adverse decision
is complex, impersonal, time-consuming, adversarial, and mysterious.”).
88. Value Options, Inc., Assurance No. 14-176 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/
ValueOptionsAOD-FullyExecuted.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2CK-9MTE]. Note that the facts
in these agreements are fact-findings by the investigators and are not admitted facts by
the defendants.
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agreement, ValueOptions paid $250,000 in previously denied
claims and a fine of $900,000. 89 Another large company, the BC/
BS licensee named Excellus, denied inpatient substance use disorder treatment seven times as often as inpatient medical services. 90
Even when plans follow the letter of the Parity Law, a paradoxical effect sometimes results. For example, the standard inpatient rehabilitation stay used to be thirty days, but the Parity
Law prohibits numerical limits for mental health and addiction
treatment that are not similarly imposed on medical and surgical
treatment. 91 Because medical treatment is not standardized at
thirty days, mental health treatment cannot be meted out that
way either. With numerical limits prohibited, insurers have cut
down, often approving as few as five days’ treatment, with patients then fighting for additional days. 92 In some cases just one
day of substance abuse treatment is approved at a time, according to a recent settlement agreement, even though, as the agreement states, “[I]t is not possible to complete substance abuse rehabilitation treatment in one day.” 93
1. The Medical Necessity Rabbit Hole
Furthermore, the approval of additional days (or any days at
all) depends on whether the treatment is deemed “medically necessary.” 94 This subjective determination is where many claims
flounder. 95 Medical necessity can be a difficult standard to apply
89. Id. at 44; Press Release, ValueOptions, supra note 84.
90. Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen. Press Office, A.G. Schneiderman Announces Settlement with Excellus Health Plan to End Wrongful Denial of Mental Health and Addiction (Mar. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Press Release], Excellus], https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/
ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-excellus-health-plan-end-wrongful-denial-mental
[https://perma.cc/B99K-XYPF] (describing settlement agreement in which Excellus would
reform its claims processing procedures, pay up to $9 million in previously denied claims,
and refrain from using improper requirements such as mandating that individuals fail at
one treatment before obtaining another) .
91. D. Brian Hufford, Insurers Have to Pay for Addiction Treatment. Trump Just Has
to Enforce the Law, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
posteverything/wp/2017/11/08/why-wont-the-trump-administration-push-insurers-to-payfor-treating-addiction/ [https://perma.cc//D4W7-2NQ4].
92. Id.
93. ValueOptions, Inc., Assurance No. 14-176) (Mar. 4, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/
ValueOptionsAOD-FullyExecuted.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2CK-9MTE].
94. Id. at 5.
95. SARAH ROSENBAUM ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL
NECESSITY IN PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CARE 12–
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to any claim, because most plans have a multipart, complex definition that can lend itself to subjective applications. 96 In addition,
denial on the basis of medical necessity is particularly hard to
appeal when, as was the case at ValueOptions, the denial is set
out in boilerplate language rather than specifics. 97 Medical necessity has, for these reasons, long been a problematic source of denials and inconsistent decision making. 98
Medical necessity is even more difficult to assess in mental
health and substance abuse cases, in part because of the complicated factual records such cases often contain, with sometimescontradictory evidence. 99 When every day of treatment must be
13 (2003).
96. Here is the definition of “medically necessary” from a 2018 BlueCross BlueShield
of Texas employer-sponsored plan:
Medically Necessary or Medical Necessity means those services or supplies
covered under the Plan which are:
1. Essential to, consistent with, and provided for the diagnosis or the
direct care and treatment of the condition, sickness, disease, injury, or
bodily malfunction; and
2. Provided in accordance with and are consistent with generally accepted standards of medical practice in the United States; and
3. Not primarily for the convenience of the Participant, his Physician,
Behavioral Health Practitioner, the Hospital, or the Other Provider;
and
4. The most economical supplies or levels of service that are appropriate for the safe and effective treatment of the Participant. When applied to hospitalization, this further means that the Participant requires acute care as a bed patient due to the nature of the services
provided or the Participant’s condition, and the Participant cannot receive safe or adequate care as an outpatient.
The medical staff of the Claim Administrator . . . shall determine whether a
service or supply is Medically Necessary under the Plan and will consider the
views of the state and national medical communities, the guidelines and
practices of Medicare, Medicaid, or other government-financed programs, and
peer reviewed literature. Although a Physician, Behavioral Health Practitioner or Professional Other Provider may have prescribed treatment, such
treatment may not be Medically Necessary within this definition.
BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF TEX., YOUR HEALTH CARE BENEFITS PROGRAM: CITY OF
RICHARDSON 53 (2018), http://www.cor.net/home/showdocument?id=20972 [https://perma.
cc/ 2XJY-DEK7].
97. ValueOptions, Inc., Assurance No. 14-176) (Mar. 4, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/
ValueOptionsAOD-FullyExecuted.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2CK-9MTE] (stating that Emblem admitted that ValueOptions’ denial letters “primarily state in general rather than
specific terms why the member’s condition does not meet medical necessity criteria” and
that the letters were insufficient and often “mischaracterize[d] the level of treatment requested”).
98. Sage, supra note 26, at 601 (“[D]ecisions involving medical necessity are frequently characterized by inconsistent administration, poor communication, distrust and, if disputes arise, relatively unprincipled, results-oriented judicial resolution.”).
99. Frenkel, supra note 81, at 1190–91.
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justified as “medically necessary,” treatment becomes shorter,
which is proven to hurt mental health and substance abuse patients. 100 Substance abuse treatment’s success turns in part on
the treatment’s length and intensity. 101 Furthermore, a mental
health or substance abuse patient might be stable in treatment
but quickly deteriorate if discharged before treatment is complete. 102 This definition is thus a poor fit for mental health and
addiction treatment, and the specific cases bear this out.
2. Specific Cases: The Human Cost
On appeal of a mental health medical necessity determination,
contradictory evidence favors the claims administrator, because
there is frequently at least some crumb of evidence to support the
denial. 103 For example, the case of Island View Residential
Treatment Center v. BlueCross BlueShield featured a typically
lengthy and complex record with conflicting evidence, which provided an easy path to affirming the denial of payment. 104 The patient was a minor and the plan participant was her parent. 105 The
patient, Sarah, was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, cannabis dependence, and an eating disorder. 106 She at times indicated she
did not care if she lived or died and entered into a suicide pact
with another patient at a treatment facility. 107 On the night before her admission to one of the facilities, she had run away, was
smoking marijuana, and was found partially clothed in a field. 108
100. Id. at 1196 (citing Rani A. Desai et al., Mental Health Service Delivery & Suicide
Risk, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 311, 313 (2005)).
101. Id. (citing MARGARET EDMUNDS ET AL., INST. OF MED., MANAGING MANAGED CARE:
QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS IN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 84 (1997)).
102. Id. at 1195 (“Medical necessity only permits psychiatrists to stabilize patients
without addressing the patients’ underlying issues and treatment resistance.”).
103. See, e.g., Burton v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, No. A-09-CA-532-SS, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 58267, at *34–35 (W.D. Tex. June 14, 2010) (affirming denial of disability
benefits and noting that “[t]he evidence in this case from the physicians who personally
examined Burton is, at best, inconsistent and highly inconclusive (and at worst, nonexistent) on the question of whether he was impaired due to bipolar disorder in March
2007”). The Burton court noted the arbitrary and capricious standard and also that the
plaintiff almost certainly suffered from bipolar disorder at the relevant times, and that his
non-compliance with the policy requirements might have been a symptom of the disorder.
Id. at *35–36.
104. No. 07-10581-DPW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94901, at *62–65, *69–70, *72–73, *78
(D. Mass. Dec. 28, 2007).
105. Id. at *2–3.
106. Id. at *7–9.
107. Id. at *11.
108. Id. at *9–10.
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She was treated at several different residential programs, and
BlueCross BlueShield denied the vast majority of the claims for
the treatment. 109
The court’s path to affirming the denial is typical of this kind of
case:
(1) The presence of a discretionary clause, triggering the lenient arbitrary and capricious review. In this case, the requisite
language was in the plan. 110
(2) The next step was the presence of an extensive, multipart
“medical necessity” plan provision. 111
(3) Next, the court pointed to facts in the record supporting
both the denial and provision of benefits. 112 But under arbitrary
and capricious review, however, the facts supporting the plaintiffs’ view were simply “off base.” 113 This is because the stated
goal of the arbitrary and capricious standard is not to determine
the right outcome, but to see whether the denial before the court
can be supported by any evidence. 114 As long as the supporting
facts are there, the others are not even addressed.

109.
110.
111.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *52–53.
Id. at *5–6. The opinion describes the clause as follows:
First, the “health care services must be required to diagnose or treat [the
claimant’s] illness, injury, symptom, complaint or condition.” Second, the services had to be “[c]onsistent with the diagnosis and treatment of [the claimant’s] condition.” Third, the services had to be “[e]ssential to improve [the
claimant’s] net health outcome and as beneficial as any established alternative covered by this contract”’ Fourth, the services had to be “[a]s cost effective as any established alternatives and consistent with the level of skilled
services that are furnished.” Finally, the services had to be “[f]urnished in the
least intensive type of medical care setting required by [the claimant’s] medical condition.”
Id. (alterations in original).
112. Id. at *62–63, *69–71.
113. Id. at *65.
114. Id. (stating that the standard is “not which side we believe is right, but whether
[the decision maker] had substantial evidentiary grounds for a reasonable decision in its
favor” (quoting Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1998))). A
dissenter in the Doyle opinion stated that the majority’s analysis of the record, which the
dissent described as “choos[ing] between doctors . . . selectively read[ing] medical reports
from the same doctors or evaluators, selecting those parts which support its action and
ignoring those which do not”, effectively meant that review of “total disability” cases were
rendered “substantially review-free” by this kind of review. Doyle, 144 F.3d at 189 (Cofin,
J., dissenting).
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(4) The absence of the treating physician rule, meaning that
the reviewing court was not required to give special deference to
physicians who actually treated the patient over those hired by
the payor who has denied the claims. 115 The court noted the financial conflict present in the case, namely that the claims administrator was also responsible for payment. 116 The lenient
abuse of discretion standard of review, however, remained unchanged. 117
Indeed, courts regularly recognize the conflict that exists when
the same entity both decides and pays claims. 118 But plaintiffs are
not entitled to an automatic reduction in deference due to such a
conflict. 119 To change the lenient standard of review, the plaintiff
must in many cases bring forward evidence of how that conflict
affected the claim. 120 Thus, with a complicated factual record, a
lenient standard of review despite clear structural conflicts, mental health and addiction cases are even more vulnerable to unfair
denials than medical cases.
Claims processing practices such as these should not be further
protected by discretionary clauses that protect the decisionmakers.
3. Appeal and External Review
External review is available—and often effective—but mental
health claimants rarely apply. ERISA provides for an internal
115. Island View Residential Treatment Ctr., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94901, at
*73–74 (stating the general rules that in ERISA cases, unlike in Social Security disability
cases, treating physicians’ opinions are not entitled to special deference (citing Black &
Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825, 834 (2003))).
116. Id. at *54 (“[T]here is a conflict of interest because Blue Cross has the role of both
the payor of claims and the Plan Fiduciary/Plan Administrator.”).
117. See id. at *59.
118. See, e.g., Adamson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 455 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir.
2006) (“Whatever the merits concerning the potential motivation of an insurer doubling as
a plan administrator, such observations were never meant to be an ipso facto conclusive
presumption to be applied without regard to the facts of the case—including the solvency
of the insurer or the nature or size of the claim. The fact that Unum administered and insured the group term life insurance portion of this plan does not on its own warrant a further reduction in deference.”).
119. Id. at 1212–13.
120. “The F. Family must instead offer some proof that a conflict ‘could [have] plausibly
jeopardize[d] the plan administrator’s impartiality.’ It has failed to do so.” Joseph F. v.
Sinclair Servs. Co., 158 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1250 (C.D. Utah 2016) (alterations in original)
(footnote omitted). The court did not state what such evidence would look like, or how the
family would go about finding it. The court did not consider the defendant’s counterfactual reason for the claim denial as evidence of a conflict.
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appeal process for denied claims, and since the ACA’s passage an
external review by a more independent person must also be
available. 121 While external review was rightly heralded as an
important new right, 122 external review processes are notoriously
under-used. Plan participants simply do not access the process. 123
One reason for the low usage is that claimants are already beleaguered by illness and paperwork so they are hard pressed to
work through the multiple internal reviews required before external review is available: “[I]t helps to consider the kind of consumers who might need to appeal a claims denial—including, for
example, patients undergoing chemotherapy, extensive surgery,
or severe mental illness, or terminally ill patients seeking experimental therapies.” 124

121. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) created authority for
new internal and external claims and appeals procedures to be issued jointly by the Department of Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor’s Employee
Benefits Security Administration (“EBSA”), and the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
sec. 1001, § 2719, 124 Stat. 119, 137–38 (enacted on March 23); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (enacted on March 30);
Sinclair Servs. Co., 158 F. Supp. 3d, at 1250; Juliette Forstenzer Espinoza, Strengthening
Appeals Rights for Privately Insured Patients: The Impact of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, PUB. HEALTH REP. 460 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc
/articles/PMC3366385/pdf/phr1270004604.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYB3-4XU4]; Extension of
Non-Enforcement Period Relating to Certain Interim Procedures for Internal Claims and
Appeals Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Mar. 8,
2011), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/technical-relea
ses/11-01 [https://perma.cc/R7NF-YM2C]. The court also did not state what such evidence
would look like, or how the family would go about finding it. The court did not consider the
defendant’s counter-factual reason for the claim denial as evidence of a conflict.
122. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor Press Office, Administration Announces New
Affordable Care Act Measures to Protect Consumers and Put Patients Back in Charge of
Their Care (July 22, 2010), [https://perma.cc/25PF-PF5Y] (stating that the new rules
would help end “some of the worst insurance company abuses”).
123. Dustin D. Berger, The Management of Health Care Costs: Independent Medical
Review After “Obamacare”, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 288 (2010) (“The consensus seems to
be that [independent medical review] is a critical consumer protection against faulty or
biased MCO denials of care . . . [independent medical review] may even legitimize the process of utilization review because it ensures that consumers can resort to an independent
and unbiased medical appeal.”); Karen Pollitz et al., Assessing State External Review Programs and the Effects of Pending Federal Patient’s Right Legislation, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., at v, vii, 2–3, 5, 7 (2000), https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/1bk4e4owpwjy48vu88
xgnvwheuc88fty. (“Taken together, these findings suggest that the internal appeals process is too lengthy and difficult for most consumers to complete, and may result in the very
low use of external review observed in every state.”).
124. Geraldine Dallek & Karen Pollitz, External Review of Health Plan Decisions: An
Update, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 4 (2000), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2013/01/external-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC39-3ZPV].
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Obstacles that the healthy can overcome may be overwhelming
for the severely ill. 125 The drop-out rate is high at each level of
appeal, leaving only a handful of claimants who persist all the
way to external review. 126
The mental health claims utilization process described above is
much more intensive and time-consuming even than the everyday
medical claims process, so it is unsurprising that few mental
health claimants access external review. Recent investigations
revealed that claimants in some cases could not even request authorization for additional days or visits until the claims for all
previously authorized days or visits had been exhausted—a process that could take weeks or months. 127 Faced with this byzantine process, fewer than eighty of the 2300 eligible ValueOptions
members persisted through the internal appeals and filed for external review. 128 As noted above, ValueOptions often granted or
denied inpatient substance abuse treatment one day at a time—
each day’s denial, therefore, would be a separate claim that a participant would need to pursue all the way to external review. 129
This would be a dizzyingly complex task for any person, let alone
a person beset with addiction or serious mental illness of a level
that would require inpatient treatment.
When participants did reach external review, however, the results were striking: forty-two percent of externally reviewed denials were reversed from 2011 to 2013. 130 Even more telling, the
mere filing of an external review often resulted in a denial’s reversal: when Emblem plan staff were directed to review mental
health claims before they went to external review, Emblem then
reversed its denial in twenty percent of the cases it reviewed, before that claim ever actually reached the external reviewer’s
desk. 131 Apparently, Emblem knew the right result all along.
125. Id.
126. Pollitz, supra note 123, at 5 (“At each stage of the process, a substantial proportion of consumers do not challenge adverse decisions by their health plans.” The same
study gives the example of consumers in Pennsylvania, where “from January 1999
through September 2000, consumers appealed almost 8,200 health plan denials,” 4469 of
which were upheld. Of these 4469, only 1062 pursued the second level of appeal. Of those
1062, 618 were upheld, but only 124 of the persistently denied claims were pursued to external appeal level.).
127. ValueOptions, Inc., Assurance No. 14-176) (Mar. 4, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/
ValueOptionsAOD-FullyExecuted.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2CK-9MTETE].
128. Id. at 11.
129. See id. at 10.
130. Id. at 11.
131. Id.
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The degree to which externally reviewed claims are reversed
speaks to the poor quality of decision making at the initial and internal appeal levels, and one cannot help wonder how many improperly denied claims remained denied due to the participant’s
inability to persist through levels of denial.
4.

The Devastating Results

Denial of access to mental health and addiction treatment can
be devastating. Here are a few specific instances from recent investigations: A fourteen-year-old plan member with an eating
disorder was receiving partial hospitalization when ValueOptions
denied additional days, her treatment had to be disrupted while
her family appealed, causing great emotional distress. 132 In another case, ValueOptions denied coverage of residential treatment
for a young woman with anorexia nervosa whose weight was dangerously low: seventy-two percent of her ideal body weight; the
external reviewer was strongly critical of the claims processor’s
actions on this claim. 133 Although improper mental health and
addiction claim denials can be measured in dollars and cents, the
immense human cost must also be considered.
In sum, it is difficult to know the exact effect of discretionary
clauses on claims processing. In hearings, investigations, and
studies, however, a theme emerges: When a discretionary clause
is present, claims processing is less extensive, there is less medical review, and less evidence is needed to uphold a denial. 134
III. THE RISING TIDE AGAINST DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES
Discretionary clauses have long been the target of criticism
from policy-makers, judges, and commentators, 135 but outright re132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 17.
134. See, e.g., Health Insurance and Managed Care (B) Committee, 2004 WL 3650374,
at *6–7 (2004) (“When the threshold of proof is reduced, companies will limit the amount
of investment they make in their claims department. The inclination then is to have less
medical review and resources expended; therefore, the management of claims are reduced.” “Commissioner Gomez reiterated that when he was in private practice he noticed
a pattern that when the [discretionary] clause was in effect, the files were thinner and it
took very little to uphold the finding.”).
135. Judge Richard Posner observed that employee benefits (in that case, a pension)
are “too important . . . for most employees to want to place them at the mercy of a biased
tribunal subject to only a narrow form of ‘arbitrary and capricious’ review, relying on the
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jection of these clauses is now spreading rapidly through the
states. The bans’ effect on ERISA plans, however, is uneven.
A. The State-Law Bans
State insurance officials from across the political spectrum are
now banning discretionary clauses in state insurance products,
calling them unfair to citizens. These bans grew out of the NAIC’s
analysis in the wake of the Unum scandal. The NAIC studied the
clauses and concluded that they should be banned as “inequitable, deceptive, and misleading to consumers. 136 In particular, the
NAIC worried about the conflict that arises when the claims adjudicator is also the plan’s administrator or insurer. 137
So, in 2002, the NAIC drafted a model act entitled the Prohibition on the Use of Discretionary Clauses Model Act. 138 The model
act shows state legislatures how to pass laws that prohibit discretionary clauses in health insurance contracts. 139 The model law’s
purpose is to ensure that consumers receive those benefits to
which they are due and that “health insurance benefits and disability income protection coverage are contractually guaranteed.” 140 The law also takes into account the inherent conflict existing when the entity paying the claims is the same one deciding
them. 141 Twenty-five states have either banned or limited discrecompany’s [own] interest in its reputation to prevent it from acting on its bias.” Van Boxel
v. Journal Co. Emps.’ Pension Tr., 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987).
136. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 71, at 16. Some bans prohibit discretionary
clauses only in certain types of insurance policies, such as health or disability, while others ban discretionary clauses across many categories of insurance. See e.g., Meyer &
DeBofsky, supra note 69, at 5–6 (noting, for example, that Texas bans discretionary clauses in health and disability insurance policies, while Washington bans discretionary clauses
in all insurance policies).
137. Id. at 11 (stating that there is a clear conflict of interest when the employer “both
funds the plan and evaluates the claim” (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105,
111 (2008))).
138. MODEL REGULATION SERV., PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES
MODEL ACT § 4 (Nat’l Assoc. of Ins. Comm’rs 2006), https://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL42.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3YX-CSMA]; Joshua Foster, Note, ERISA, Trust Law, and the
Appropriate Standard of Review: A De Novo Review of Why the Elimination of Discretionary Clauses Would Be an Abuse of Discretion, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 745 (2008).
139. See Foster, supra note 138, at 745.
140. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES MODEL ACT, supra note 138,
§ 4.
141. The model act’s purpose is “to avoid the conflict of interest that occurs when the
carrier responsible for providing benefits has discretionary authority to decide what benefits are due.” Id.; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 71, at 18.
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tionary clauses in health insurance policies governed by ERISA,
or are in the process of doing so. 142
Such bans may be prompted by the insurance commission’s
staff or as a result of complaints that prompt further analysis. In
the case of the State of Hawaii, the ban arose out of complaints
from employers who did not want their employees to be subject to
discretionary clauses in their health insurance policies. 143 The
Hawaii Insurance Commissioner rejected discretionary clauses as
a breach of the insurer’s fiduciary duty and of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing in every contract. 144
The California legislature enacted a ban on discretionary
clauses 145 after some particularly egregious instances of claim
denials involving discretionary clauses. 146 Like a similar ban in
Texas, 147 the ban is broad, applying to any “policy, contract, certificate, or agreement.” 148 Similarly, the Utah Insurance Commis142. Owens v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 184 F. Supp. 3d 580, 584 (W.D. Ky. 2016).
143. Memorandum 2004-13H from J.P. Schmidt, Insurance Commissioner, State of
Hawaii Insurance Division, Department of Commerce & Consumer Affairs, to HMSA, Mutual Benefits Societies, Health Maintenance Organizations, and Insurers Offering Health
Insurance (Dec. 8, 2004), http://files.hawaii.gov/dcca/ins/commissioners_memo/commission
ers_memorandum_2004/ins_commissioners_memorandum_13h.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG3
W-LZXC] (“[T]he Insurance Commissioner has received a number of complaints regarding
various provisions questioned by employers as to legality. Of particular concern is clause
15 of the Agreement for Group Health Plan entitled ‘[Insurer’s] Discretionary Authority.’”).
144. Id. at 5.
Such contractual provisions are a violation of the insurer’s obligation to act in
good faith and deal fairly because a conflict of interest occurs when an insurer has discretionary authority to interpret the insurance contract in regards
to what benefits it will pay . . . Such contractual provisions are a breach of an
insurer’s fiduciary duty to act solely in the interest of its insureds who are
plan participants and beneficiaries.
Id.; see also Meyer & DeBofsky, supra note 69, at 5.
145. CAL. INS. CODE §10110.6 (West 2013 & Supp. 2018).
146. See, e.g., Saffon v. Wells Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 522 F.3d 863,
873 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that insurer sent nonsensical denial letters, denied coverage
despite a lack of medical progress, and did not send letter requiring additional information
to the plaintiff).
147. TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1203 (West 2017).
148. CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.6 (2013 & West Supp. 2018).
(a) If a policy, contract, certificate, or agreement offered, issued, delivered, or
renewed, whether or not in California, that provides or funds life insurance
or disability insurance coverage for any California resident contains a provision that reserves discretionary authority to the insurer, or an agent of the
insurer, to determine eligibility for benefits or coverage, to interpret the
terms of the policy, contract, certificate, or agreement, or to provide standards of interpretation or review that are inconsistent with the laws of this
state, that provision is void and unenforceable.
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sioner banned discretionary clauses with a strongly worded
statement declaring them unfair and deceptive. 149 In conservative
and more liberal states alike, discretionary clauses are being
banned as deceptive and unfair.
B. State Bans and ERISA Plans
Recent caselaw makes clear that state-law discretionary clause
bans extend not only to state insurance products but also to insured ERISA-governed products, through ERISA’s preemption
carve-out for state insurance laws. Self-funded ERISA plans,
though, remain untouched.
ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 150 The
preemption command is broad: “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee
benefit plan . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan.” 151 State law bans on discretionary clauses fall within the
preemption clause because they “relate to [a] employee benefit
plan.” 152
Even though discretionary clauses fall within ERISA’s broad
preemption clause, this is not the end of the analysis. The discretionary clause bans are then saved from preemption because they
satisfy the applicable two-part test: the laws are (1) specifically
directed toward insurance and (2) they substantially affect the
risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured. 153
(b) For purposes of this section, “renewed” means continued in force on or after the policy’s anniversary date.

Id.
149. Discretionary clauses purport to give an insurer full and final discretion in
interpreting benefits in an insurance contract. In the department’s view, under
Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.) § 31A-21-201(3), those clauses and provisions in
accident and health, life, and annuity insurance contracts are inequitable, misleading, deceptive, obscure, unfair, not in the public interest, and otherwise
contrary to law, and they encourage misrepresentation and violate a statute.
UTAH INS. DEP’T, INS. COMM’R, BULL. NO. 2002-7, DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES PROHIBITED
(2002), https://insurance.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/2002-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VE4B95T].
150. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
151. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138–39 (1990) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 465 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983)).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012); Orzechowski v. Boeing Co. Non-Union Long-Term Disability Plan, 856 F.3d 686, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2017).
153. Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341–42 (2003); see
also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 355 (2002); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
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Laws are specifically directed toward the insurance industry if
they are based in “policy concerns specific to the insurance industry.” 154 While ERISA defendants argued that discretionary clause
bans are preempted with regard to ERISA plans, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently made clear that they are not. 155
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently concurred that
although the employers and plans at issue are not insurance
companies they need not be insurance companies in order for the
bans to govern the plans themselves. 156 That is, the discretionary
clause bans are still directed towards the insurance industry and
satisfy the first prong. 157 Furthermore, the bans satisfy the second prong of the test, namely in that they substantially affect the
risk pooling arrangement between insurer and insured. 158 When
a discretionary clause is banned, this affects the risk pooling arrangement, because the ban limits the relationship between the
insurer and the insured, also directly governing the claims that
will be paid. 159
Thus, discretionary clause bans are saved from preemption and
insurers can no longer include discretionary clauses in ERISA
policies subject to state law. This is a highly significant victory for
the states seeking to ban discretionary clauses—in its writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court (which was denied), Standard Insurance stated that “this issue . . . affects a massive number of
cases, as there are nearly two million ERISA benefits denials
annually that are potentially subject to challenge in federal court
. . . .” 160

Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48–50 (1987).
154. Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 363, 368, 372–73 (1999).
155. Orzechowski, 856 F.3d at 692.
156. Fontaine v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 883, 889–90, 892 (7th Cir. 2015).
157. The court explained that despite its effects outside the insurance industry, the law
was still specifically directed toward insurance for purposes of the preemption analysis:
While [the law firm] is not an insurer and is nevertheless affected by [the
prohibition], that does not mean that [the law] is not specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance. The Supreme Court rejected essentially
the same too-clever argument in Miller . . . . Prohibitions on discretionary
clauses, like any-willing-provider laws, have similarly inevitable effects on
“entities outside the insurance industry.” Just as in Miller, that does not
change their character as insurance regulations.
Id. at 887.
158. Id. at 887–88.
159. Orzechowski, 856 F.3d at 694.
160. See Morrison & McDonald, supra note 50, at 483 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Standard Ins. Co. v. Lindeen, 560 U.S. 904 (2010) (No. 09-885)).
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Discretionary clause bans are thus saved from preemption, but
the millions of people insured under self-funded plans are still
subject to discretionary clauses. That is, because of their selffunded status, a large portion of ERISA plans are nonetheless exempt from these state-law discretionary clause bans as well as
other state laws and regulations. 161 This outcome is mandated by
the architecture of ERISA, which contains another related clause
that prevents state laws from directly affecting self-funded
ERISA plans. 162
As explained above, self-funded plans are plans in which claims
are paid by the employer itself, perhaps also with stop-loss insurance. 163 ERISA itself states that these self-funded plans can never be deemed to be insurance, and the state laws do not touch
these plans. 164 Thus, the result is a bright line rule—state-law
discretionary bans apply to non-ERISA insurance products as
well as ERISA-governed insured plans, but not to self-funded
ERISA plans. 165
Thus, in the movement against discretionary clauses, there
remain only two categories of plans that are not subject to discretionary clause bans: insurance products in those states that have
opted not to adopt such plans (although the number that has
adopted them is growing), and ERISA plans that are self-funded
161. [T]he deemer clause’s scope turns on the presence or absence of traditional
insurance. If the state law is applied to a traditional insurance policy, then the
state law falls outside the deemer clause and thus within the saving clause—
even if the insurance policy backstops an ERISA plan. On the other hand, if the
state law is applied to an ERISA plan itself, which is how such laws operate on
self-funded plans, the law falls within the deemer clause and thus is preempted, even if it is a bona fide insurance regulation that only incidentally affects
ERISA concerns. The result is a simple, bright-line rule: “if a plan is insured, a
State may regulate it indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer’s insurance contracts; if the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it.”
Williby v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (citing
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64 (1990)).
162. Id.
163. Goldin, supra note 38, at 440.
164. Williby, 867 F.3d at 1136.
165. The court notes the Ninth Circuit has most recently decided Williby v. Aetna Ins. Co., in which it held ERISA preempted California Insurance Code section 10110.6(a) to the extent it would otherwise be applicable to a ‘self-funded’
ERISA plan. Williby is distinguishable from the instant case, because the Plan
at issue here is not self-funded, but is an insurance policy.
Dorsey v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:15-cv-02126-KJM-CKD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
139010, at *25 & n.11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017) (citations omitted) (citing Williby, 867 F.3d
at 1137).
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by the employer. Ironically, then, the plans subject to the federal
law that was meant to help employees and preserve their benefits
is leaving them worse off than before. ERISA, however, has of
course been amended before, and the time has come to amend it
and ban the unfair and unwarranted discretionary clauses.
IV. NO BASIS FOR DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES IN ERISA PLANS
Discretionary clauses have no place in ERISA plans, especially
self-funded plans, and the current mental health and opioid crisis
heightens the need for their removal. Discretionary clauses undermine ERISA plans, especially self-funded plans. The facts do
not support economic justifications for the inclusion of discretionary clauses.
A. Discretionary Clauses Are at Odds with ERISA’s Two Main
Legislative Purposes
Discretionary clauses are directly at odds with the following
aspects of ERISA:
Ensuring contracted benefits. Congress enacted ERISA to protect contracted benefits 166—discretionary clauses undermine this
goal. As an initial matter, ERISA’s overarching goal and raison
d’être is the preservation of employees’ interests in their benefit
plans. 167 Discretionary clauses undermine this goal, because they
allow claims decisions to be made within a spectrum of discretion,
rather than according to the qualifications for receiving benefits.

166. “Congress enacted ERISA to ‘protect . . . the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries’ by setting out substantive regulatory requirements
for employee benefit plans and to ‘provid[e] for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts.’” Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (alterations in original) (quoting ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012)); see also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 100 (2013) (stating that “ERISA’s principal function” is “to ‘protect contractually defined benefits’” (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)); Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 516–17
(2010) (“Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that employees would receive the benefits they
had earned” and to ensure “fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan . . . .”);
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits . . . .”).
167. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of
this chapter to protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans . . . .”).
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Ready access to the federal courts. Furthermore, ERISA was
meant to allow ready access to the federal courts. 168 When a discretionary clause applies, the plaintiff does not have access to a
federal court’s full review of a denial. The court’s review is necessarily constrained, the analysis is less searching, and the review
depends on whether the denial is based on some reason, rather
than whether the denial is correct. In this fashion, plan participants are denied the courts’ analysis of their claims, and their access to the courts is constrained.
The duty to follow ERISA’s statutory terms over any plan term.
Even if a term contravening ERISA is included in an ERISA plan,
the fiduciaries should not follow it. Where, for example, a plan
provision required trustees to follow plan participants’ instructions, the Department of Labor observed that ERISA’s prudence
and exclusive purpose still applied: “[W]hen a conflict between
the prudence standard and plan provisions occurs, section
404(a)(1)(D) requires that the plan provisions give way to the
statutory requirements.” 169 Likewise, when an ERISA plan clause
required forfeiture of pension benefits, a court found that the
clause violated ERISA section 203; the clause had to yield to
ERISA’s clear statutory commands. 170 A denial of pensions would
violate the vesting rules of ERISA section 203, and the clause
that called for this denial was not consistent with the provisions
of Title I. Therefore, the court held the Committee’s members in
breach of their section 404(a) duty. 171
B. The Trust-Law Basis for Discretionary Clauses Is Ill-Founded
The prevalence of discretionary clauses grew out of the Supreme Court’s analogy to trust law in the Firestone case. 172 In
that case, the Court explained trust law’s influence on ERISA,
and how the statute “codif[ied] and ma[de] applicable to [ERISA]
fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law

168. Id. (“It is hearby declared to be the policy of this chapter to . . . provid[e] . . . ready
access to the Federal courts.”).
169. Dep’t of Lab., Opinion Letter on Tender Offers (Feb. 23, 1989), BNA Pension Rep.,
390. Accord Winer v. Edison Bros. Stores Pension Plan, 447 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Mo.
1978), aff’d, 593 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979).
170. Winer, 447 F. Supp. at 837.
171. Id.
172. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989).
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of trusts.” 173 But there is a limit: “wholesale importation of the
arbitrary and capricious standard into ERISA is unwarranted.” 174
The Court explained a basis in trust law for a deferential
standard of review when a trustee exercises discretionary powers:
that is, when discretionary power is given to a trustee, then the
review of that exercise should be deferential. 175 The Court also
emphasized that the review should depend on the terms of the
trust, and that in the absence of such a discretionary grant (as
was the case in Firestone), the review should be de novo. 176 Indeed, the overarching message of Firestone is that de novo review,
not deferential review, makes more sense in the context of this
consumer-protective statute: “Adopting Firestone’s reading of
ERISA would require us to impose a standard of review that
would afford less protection to employees and their beneficiaries
than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted.” 177
The Firestone Court then stated in dicta, continuing its trustlaw analogy, that there is nothing to “foreclose[] parties from
agreeing upon a narrower standard of review” than de novo.” 178
But there are two problems with this analogy. First, trust law
was always meant as a starting point for ERISA law, not the
guiding principle. 179 ERISA’s legislative purpose of employee benefit protection was always meant to override any allegiance to
trust law principles. 180 Moreover, trust law and ERISA law are
fundamentally different. ERISA was enacted to protect employees’ benefits, whereas trust law carries out a settlor’s intent. 181

173. Id. at 110 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 4649 (1973)).
174. Id. at 109.
175. Id. at 111 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1959)).
176. Id. at 115.
177. Id. at 113–14.
178. Id. at 115.
179. Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“[W]e believe that the law of trusts often
will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret
ERISA’s fiduciary duties. In some instances, trust law will offer only a starting point, after
which courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the language of the statute, its
structure, or its purposes require departing from common-law trust requirements.”).
180. Id.
181. John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal
and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1336
(2007) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document
is the donor’s intention . . . .” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003))); accord. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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The settlor of a trust therefore acts with an autonomy that is appropriate for that donative role. 182 Employee benefits, of course,
are not a gift but are a substantial part of employees’ compensation package and the source of tax advantages for employers. 183
Second, the notion that employees can “agree” to accept a particular standard of review for their benefit claim denials ignores
the reality of how employment negotiations function and the present ubiquity of discretionary clauses. First of all, the employee
does not “agree” to any particular benefit term through individual
negotiation. 184 A potential employee can perhaps negotiate the
amount of money that he or she will contribute to the cost of benefits, but job-seekers are not advised to negotiate details such as
standards of review in existing benefit plans. 185 A review of popular websites advising job seekers to negotiate various aspects of
their contribution to benefits did not raise the issue of standard of
review, or give any advice at all regarding discretionary clauses. 186 Thus, the idea that employees have “agreed” to such clauses
does not appear to be based in reality.
Thus, although Firestone contemplated some sort of trust-based
employee negotiation that could result in a fair adoption of the
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Employee Benefits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/employee-benefits [https://perma.cc/X9UN-DKEQ
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018), (explaining the tax advantages of offering employee benefit
plans); News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employer Costs for Employee Compensation—
December 2016 (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_0317
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WEE-T4AJ] (noting that employee benefits amount to about
one-third of employee compensation).
184. See, e.g., Muir & Stein, supra note 18, at 519 (“[B]enefit plans are typically not the
bilateral product of active bargaining by the parties but rather are drafted by the employer without direct, and certainly not individual, negotiation with the employees.”); Langbein, supra note 181, at 1323–34 (“As a practical matter, the employee has no opportunity
to bargain with the employer about matters such as the standard of review of benefit denials. Accordingly, it is a mischaracterization to depict these parties as ‘agreeing’ to preclude impartial judicial review of self-serving plan decisionmaking.”(footnotes omitted)).
185. See, e.g., Lillian Childress, 8 Must-Ask Questions About Your Company’s Health
Insurance Options, GLASSDOOR (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.glassdoor.com/blog/health-in
surance-options/ [https://perma.cc/X46W-GJG5] (suggesting that individuals inquire about
pre-existing condition limitations and other issues but not mentioning discretionary clauses); Vicki Salemi, Don’t Overlook These Expenses When Negotiating Your Salary,
MONSTER, https://www.monster.com/career-advice/article/compare-health-insurance-job-of
fer-open-enrollment [https://perma.cc/TNT9-8FGF] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (citing various benefit questions to ask and assess but not mentioning discretionary clauses).
186. See, e.g., Alden Wicker, 5 Often Overlooked Benefits That You Should Negotiate
with a New Job Offer, FASTCOMPANY (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/30555
41/5-often-overlooked-benefits-that-you-should-negotiate-with-a-new-job [https://perma.cc/
TFW9-GEQP].
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discretionary standard of review, that idea is inconsistent with
trust law and the realities of employees’ negotiating situation visà-vis the benefit plans offered to them.
C. Economic Concerns
Critics of further regulation of employer-sponsored plans often
make three economic arguments: (1) economic principles already
protect the consumer sufficiently due to reputational concerns
that prevent sharp claims practices, (2) claims processing without
discretionary clauses would be too expensive, (3) employers don’t
have to give any benefits, and the system should not be so complex that they refrain from doing so. These concerns are addressed in turn below.
1. Reputation
The reputational argument states that every plan sponsor and
plan administrator has a vested interest in maintaining plans
that satisfy employee-customers. 187 A company cannot succeed,
this argument goes, by denying claims and maintaining sharp
claims practices. 188 This theory is not borne out, however, when
recent fines and prosecutions for illegal claims processing are
compared with the profitability of the companies. Companies
found to be breaking the claims processing laws seem to be doing
just fine.
In 2014, UnitedHealth was fined $173 million in California for
unfair claims processing practices. 189 That same year, UnitedHealth earned record profits. 190 In 2015, the New York Attorney
General imposed large fines on claims processors ValueOptions
and Excellus and also required that the two reverse their denials

187. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 138, at 756 (“If an insurance company develops a reputation for being ineffective or unreliable, that insurance company will likely not find success within an industry teeming with other providers.”).
188. Id. at 756–57.
189. Don Jergler, UnitedHealth’s $173M Fine May Be Warning to P/C Insurers, INS. J.
(July 30, 2014), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2014/07/30/336212.htm (explaining that state officials likely believed the violations were knowing violations, given
the size of the fine and the fact that investigators had requested an even heavier fine).
190. Bob Herman, United Health Ends 2014 with Sizable Profits, MOD. HEALTHCARE
(Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150121/NEWS/150129988
[https://perma.cc/6NHM-LGMQ].
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of many claims that should have been paid. 191 ValueOptions (now
Beacon Health) is privately held, so it is difficult to know its internal finances. 192 Its website, however, reports in 2018 that it is
the undisputed leader in the field, with 4,700 employees and forty
million covered people. 193 Excellus reports that it provides health
insurance to 1.5 million members and has a Standard and Poor’s
rating of BBB+, or “stable.” 194 As explained above, Unum was cited in many cases for its sharp claims processing practices and
improper denials. 195 Its practices led to the NAIC’s creation of a
discretionary-clause ban model act. 196 Nevertheless, the company
steadily ranks in the Fortune 500. 197 If Unum’s financial health
has suffered from improper claims processing, the effects are neither obvious nor crippling.
2. Expense
Is awarding contracted benefits just too expensive? Judges, analysts, and industry representatives have speculated that if discretionary clauses are banned from insurance products, more
claims are likely to be paid, and the cost of that insurance will
hence increase. 198 A California study performed by respected human resources firm, Milliman, Inc., found that the effects on the
insurance market would be modest if discretionary clauses in disability insurance products were banned. 199 The study’s authors
predicted that in the absence of a discretionary clause, litigation
of disability claims could be expected to increase and claims pro191. Press Release, ValueOptions, supra note 84; Press Release, Excellus, supra note
90.
192. Beacon Health Options, Inc., Private Company Financial Report, PRIVCO, https:
//www.privco.com/company/beacon-health-strategies_private_stock_annual_report_financi
als [https://perma.cc/6V8C-7628] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (providing the extent of what is
publicly known about ValueOption’s internal finances).
193. Who We Are, BEACON HEALTH OPTIONS, https://www.beaconhealthoptions.com/
who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/S46W-3S69] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) .
194. Corporate Overview, Company Information, EXCELLUS, https://www.excellusbcbs.
com/wps/portal/xl/our/compinfo/ [https://perma.cc/S2QF-JS2T] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
195. Supra text accompanying notes 73–78.
196. Supra text accompanying notes 137–41.
197. Unum Group, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/unum-group/ [https://per
ma.cc/Z28K-W6KU] (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (ranking 267th in 2018).
198. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 138, at 757 (“Additional litigation ultimately means
that the insurance company, along with the beneficiaries, will have additional costs.”).
199. ROBERT W. BEAL & DANIEL D. SKWIRE, MILLIMAN, INC., IMPACT OF DISABILITY
INSURANCE POLICY MANDATES PROPOSED BY THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
8 (2005).
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cessors might permit individuals to remain on disability payments longer than they otherwise might, in order to avoid litigation. 200 While Milliman also predicted that insurance premiums
would increase, the increase would be modest, on the order of
three to four percent per year. 201
Although the Milliman study predicted an increase in litigation
in the absence of discretionary clauses, that effect would be
somewhat mitigated in the case of self-insured ERISA plans. The
non-ERISA plaintiffs analyzed in the Milliman study have the
full array of state-law remedies. 202 Furthermore, in advance of
creating their model discretionary ban law, the state insurance
commissioners who comprise NAIC assessed the prospect of increased litigation without discretionary clauses and determined
that ERISA’s limited remedial scheme would still keep litigation
in check—the result of banning discretionary clauses would be to
keep the litigation process the same except for a different standard of review. 203
If there are additional costs of providing benefits as contracted,
a portion of that cost might well be passed on to consumers. Even
if the cost increases, however, the removal of discretionary clauses would mean that plan participants could rely more on their
benefits, instead of paying their portion of the cost only to find
out that the benefits are not there when needed for a mental
health crisis or child’s struggle with an eating disorder or substance abuse. When discretionary clauses are removed from
plans, fairness is restored to claims handling; claimants are entitled to their benefits when they meet the conditions for receiving
them. 204

200. Id. at 8–9.
201. In such an environment, disability insurers might permit some insureds to remain
on disability insurance longer than they otherwise might, which would in turn cause a decrease in the recovery rate of about two to three percent. Id.
202. See Foster, supra note 138, at 755 (“[M]ost applications of state law are rendered
irrelevant by ERISA.”).
203. Health Insurance and Managed Care (B) Committee, supra note 134, at *6 (noting
that without discretionary clauses, litigation would increase but would remain constrained
by ERISA’s limited remedial scheme).
204. Morrison & McDonald, supra note 50, at 483 (“Without [the arbitrary and capricious] standard of review, insureds are entitled to their health or disability benefits when
the evidence shows they are so entitled.”).
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3. Benefits as Retractable Gifts
As courts have repeatedly recognized, employers generally
need not offer any benefit plans at all to employees—these programs are largely voluntary. This was one of the original concerns that animated ERISA’s creation. 205 Some have argued that
if discretionary clauses are banned, employers may decide not to
offer benefits at all. Indeed, this argument is repeated whenever
an employee-friendly revision to ERISA is proposed. 206
But of course, employee benefit plans are hardly a gift to employees. This view of employee benefits—known as the gratuity
theory—harkens back to the early days of pensions, when they
were considered an optional pat on the back to a faithful employee. 207 The gratuity theory has long been abandoned. 208 Today,
benefit plans are a substantial part of employees’ compensation
package and are frequently used to recruit and retain valued employees, to take advantage of tax benefits, and to substitute for
additional cash wages. 209 Furthermore, the understanding of em205. Congress sought to encourage employers to create employee benefit plans without
mandating that they do so. Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 516–17 (2010). To that
end, “ERISA ‘induc[es] employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred.’” Id. at 517 (alterations in original)
(quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002)); see also Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“Congress’ desire . . . not to create a system that
is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.”).
206. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 120 (2008) (Roberts, J., concurring). “We have long recognized ‘the public interest in encouraging the formation of
employee benefit plans.’ Ensuring that reviewing courts respect the discretionary authority conferred on ERISA fiduciaries encourages employers to provide medical and retirement benefits to their employees through ERISA-governed plans—something they are not
required to do.” Id. (citation omitted).
207. Norman Stein, An Article of Faith: The Gratuity Theory of Pensions and Faux
Church Plans, AM. B. ASSOC., http://web.archive.org/web/20180109033327/http://www.a
mericanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ebc_newsletter/14_sum_ebc_news/fai
th.html (“The age of employer-sponsored pension plans began in this country during the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, when American Express and other transportation,
retail and industrial firms adopted pension programs for their employees. For a good part
of the next century, the prevailing legal theory concerning these programs was that the
pension promise was an unenforceable promise to make a future gift--a mere gratuity. No
amount of work by an employee could ensure him the payment of a pension, and many
pension plans were largely unfunded. A pension was no better than the aggregate of an
employer’s decency and solvency. The gratuity theory, however, began to erode in the
1930s . . . .”).
208. Id.
209. “The difference between pension as contract and pension as gratuity has been a
theme of employee benefits law for more than a century, and ERISA is sometimes reck-
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ployee benefits as gifts or gratuities existed in the time before
ERISA and has since been abandoned in lieu of an understanding
of employee benefits as promised parts of an employee’s compensation. 210
As an important part of employees’ compensation, benefit plans
should not be essentially illusory, which they can be if decisionmakers can interpret plan terms and definitions as they see fit, to
the detriment of employees. After all, if discretionary clauses are
banned, denials are still reviewed, but they are reviewed in order
to reach the correct decision, on the entire record, not simply the
decision that the plan decision-maker would prefer.
V. A FEDERAL BAN ON DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES COULD
FIND BIPARTISAN GROUND
An amendment to ERISA may seem to be a partisan issue,
with business-friendly interests opposing consumer protections.
But could a discretionary clause ban be different? Perhaps so,
considering recent bipartisan work on mental health legislation,
legislators’ demonstrated willingness to negotiate over ERISA reform, and the fact that discretionary clause bans are now on the
books in both red and blue states. 211
A. Paths to Mental Health Treatment as a Bipartisan Issue
Even in the current rancorous political climate, legislators find
common ground in promoting mental health treatment. 212 The
21st Century Cures Act was the fruit of a years-long, bipartisan
and bicameral effort to aid those with mental health issues. 213 It
oned to be the culmination of an evolutionary move from employee benefit plan
as gratuity to employee benefit plan as contract.” Muir & Stein, supra note 18, at 518.
210. Id.
211. See Stephen Eide, Congress Is Making Bipartisan Progress on Mental Health
Reform, HILL (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:40 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/34
5869-congress-is-making-bipartisan-progress-on-mental-healthcare [https://perma.cc/YU
M6-WWUJ]; Discretionary Clauses Outlawed in Many States, MORGAN & PAUL, PLLC,
https://www.erisadisabilitybenefits.com/longtermdisability/discretionaryclausesbannedine
risapolicies.html [https://perma.cc/LF2H-2CAP] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); infra Part V.B.
212. Eide, supra note 211.
213. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11); Elaine Z. Loumbas, 21st Century Cures Act: A Myriad
of Health Law Remedies, 29 HEALTH LAW. 31, 31 (2017) (noting the broad bipartisan support behind this law); Maggie Fox, Senate Passes Sweeping 21st Century Cures Act Funding Medicine, NBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2016, 6:35 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-
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received overwhelming bipartisan support and passed into law in
2016. 214 This effort includes the creation of a new assistant secretary for Mental Health and Substance Use, improved coordination of mental health resources, increased steps toward mental
health parity, additional monies for the effort against opioid
abuse, and many other provisions. 215 Congress worked together
and passed a law that is recognized as both far-reaching and
helpful. 216
At the state level, discretionary clause bans have also drawn
bipartisan support, even in more conservative states. In the wake
of the Unum scandal, state insurance commissioners from across
the political spectrum worked toward banning discretionary
clauses, starting with their model act to effect this goal. 217 State
discretionary bans have been passed in more liberal states, such
as California, but also in more conservative, pro-business states,
such as Texas. 218 In Texas, which first passed a discretionary
clause ban in 2009 and expanded it in 2012, the Office of Public
Insurance Counsel reported that the ban was well received across
party lines. 219 In South Dakota, described in the New York Times
as “reliably Republican,” 220 discretionary clauses are banned in
all health plans. 221
news/senate-passes-sweeping-21st-century-cures-act-funding-medicine-n693351 [https://pe
rperma.cc/Y7MB-PNL6].
214. Loumbas, supra note 213, at 31.
215. See id. at 31–38; Mental Health Reform in the 115th Congress, AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/advocacy/federal-affairs/com
prehensive-mental-health-reform [https://perma.cc/N9EF-HBMU] (last visited Dec. 3,
2019).
216. See Fox, supra note 213.
217. See Langbein, supra note 181, at 1340; PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF
DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES MODEL ACT § 4 (MODEL REGULATION SERV. 2006), https://www.
naic.org/store/free/MDL-42.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDT5-PFMF].
218. See Discretionary Clauses Outlawed in Many States, supra note 211.
219. [The Office of Public Insurance Counsel] petitioned the Texas Department
of Insurance (TDI) to create rules prohibiting discretionary clauses in October
2009. The petition received strong support from members of the Texas Legislature, the American Association of Retired Persons, the Texas Medical Association, the National Multiple Sclerosis Society, the Center for Public Policy Priorities and many others. The rules went into full effect on June 1, 2011.
Legislature Prohibits Discretionary Clauses, OFF. PUB. INS. COUNS., http://opic.texas.
gov/health-insurance/legislature-prohibits-discretionary-clauses [https://perma.cc/35WVYG4Z].
220. South Dakota Presidential Race Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
1, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/south-dakota-preside
nt-clinton-trump [https://perma.cc/CKT9-3SAC].
221. A discretionary clause is not permitted in any individual or group health
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The difference lies, however, in the healthcare lobbying effort
in Washington, D.C., which is cohesive and well funded. 222 But as
the opioid crisis continues to worsen, the hunt for paths to treatment increases in seriousness. 223 In the case of ERISA plans, the
participants already have contracted benefits—the legislature
should take every necessary step to permit access, over any lobbying efforts.
B. Willingness to Deal
Industry lobbyists have willingly negotiated over amendments
to ERISA when faced with reform-minded legislators and the
threat of drastic changes to ERISA. In discussions long preceding
the ACA for example, Senator Edward Kennedy championed the
cause of ERISA reform, holding Senate hearings and exposing the
effects of state claim preemption in the ERISA landscape. 224

policy. No policy offered or issued in this state by a health carrier or plan to
provide, deliver, arrange for, pay for, or reimburse any of the costs of health
care services may contain a discretionary clause or similar provision purporting
to reserve discretion to the health carrier or plan to interpret the terms of the
policy or to provide standards of interpretation or review that are inconsistent
with the laws of this state. The provisions of this rule apply to any health insurance policy issued or renewed after June 30, 2008.
S.D. Admin. R. 20:06:52:02 (2008).
222. See Robert Steinbrook, Election 2008—Campaign Contributions, Lobbying, and
the U.S. Health Sector, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 736, 736–38 (2007) (describing election contributions and lobbying resources of the health care sector); Heather T. Williams, Comment, Fighting Fire with Fire: Reforming the Health Care System Through a Market-Based
Approach to Medical Tourism, 89 N.C. L. REV. 607, 660 (2011) (noting the healthcare industry’s well-funded lobbying presence in Washington, D.C.); Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Health: Sector Profile, 2017, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php
?id=H&year=2017 [https://perma.cc/PBP8-TF27] (last updated Apr. 24, 2018) (stating that
$562,953,377 were spent on healthcare lobbying in 2017, up slightly from 2016); Dan Eggen, Health Sector Has Donated Millions to Lawmakers, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2009),
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/07/AR2009030701748.html
[https://perma.cc/LY9G-T4UB](“The health-care sector has long ranked with financial services and energy interests as one of the most powerful political forces in Washington, and
it spent nearly $1 billion on lobbying in the past two years alone.”); see also David D.
Kirkpatrick, Health Lobby Takes Fight to the States, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2009), https://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/29/health/policy/29lobby.html [https://perma.cc/U54H-8FWX]
(describing extensive health care lobbying efforts).
223. Opioid Overdose: Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6ADM-NN9B] (“In 2016, the number of overdose deaths involving opioids
(including prescription opioids and illegal opioids like heroin and illicitly manufactured
fentanyl) was 5 times higher than in 1999.”).
224. ERISA Preemption Hearing, supra note 32, at 8–9.
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Senator Kennedy urged that reform of ERISA preemption was
crucial to any ERISA reform and that the industry must be held
responsible for these life-and-death decisions. 225 Faced with this
serious threat to their state-law immunity, industry and employer representatives started to deal: instead of jettisoning ERISA
preemption, they proposed, claims procedures could be reformed
and external review could be made mandatory. 226 Industry representatives stopped short of agreeing to these reforms on the spot,
but they seemed relieved at this possible substitute for more farreaching reform. 227 In the end, these more modest changes were
included in the ACA, instead of the more penetrating reform that
some had sought. 228
A ban on discretionary clauses could result from an initiative
all its own, or it could, like external review, serve as a fall-back
position from a broader reform movement taking aim at preemption. In any event, history shows that ERISA reform is difficult
but not impossible.
C. Succeeding at the State Level
An ERISA ban on discretionary clauses would draw opposition
from industry, just as it did at the state level. 229 State insurance
225. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (“Every other industry in American can be held responsible for its actions. Health plan decisions can truly mean life or
death, and they do not deserve immunity.”).
226. According to the testimony of Mr. Gallagher of Groom & Nordberg, a Washington,
D.C., employee benefits law firm, repeal of ERISA preemption would be “disastrous” for
ERISA healthcare plans. He argued that employers would scale back benefits if preemption were repealed and employers would scale back benefits. Id. Another witness, industry
representative Mark A. Smith, said external review would be a better reform than the removal of preemption:
Mr. Smith: [A]s an alternative to changing some of these ERISA remedies, we would
certainly favor some type of an appeal process to help resolve some of these issues.
Senator Specter: How about external appeal?
Mr. Smith: Under the right circumstances. That is fraught with certain difficulties,
as well. But it is something we would certainly prefer to some of the ERISA remedy
changes.
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
227. Id.
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b) (2012) (describing the external review process that
was contemplated as an alternative to repealing state preemption during the Senate
Committee Hearing concerning ERISA reform); ERISA Preemption Hearing, supra note
32, at 49.
229. See, e.g., Morrison & McDonald, supra note 50, at 486–87 (“After hearings and
comments, the Health Insurance and Managed Care (B) Committee of the NAIC voted to
adopt the ‘Prohibition on Use of Discretionary Clauses Model Act.’ At the June 2002 NAIC

VUKADIN 352 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

12/31/2018 1:44 PM

ON OPIOIDS AND ERISA

729

commissioners were able to prevail despite this opposition because of the NAIC’s research indicating that the consumer was so
clearly disadvantaged by these clauses. 230 The case is even
stronger when it comes to ERISA plans because of the structural
disadvantages to consumers and the case law that has evolved
around ERISA plans.
At every turn, the ERISA claimant is disadvantaged in ways
that the state-law plan participant is not, with regard to conflicts,
absence of remedies, and even within the most recent rulemaking as part of the ACA. First, there is the lack of a meaningful remedy if harmed by utilization review, which in turn removes
some of the incentive for plan administrators to pay claims in the
gray area for those covered by self-funded plans. 231 In addition,
ERISA plaintiffs can recover no attorneys’ fees during the prelitigation phase, and there is no discovery allowed due to the arbitrary and capricious standard. 232 As a secondary effect, the lack of
a real remedy or attorney’s fees for ERISA violations also makes
ERISA cases very unappealing for attorneys to take. 233
As another disadvantage, the ACA’s new external review requirement is less stringent for ERISA plans. The ACA adds binding external review to ERISA and non-ERISA plans—the review
must be done by an independent review organization (“IRO”). 234
Plans must “implement an effective external review process that
meets minimum standards established by the Secretary.” 235 The
rules require that plans assign external reviews to an IRO accredited by the Utilization Review Accreditation Commission
(“URAC”) or by another national accrediting organization. 236

meeting, despite a ‘flurry of notes to commissioners’ and an industry attempt to derail the
model act procedurally, the NAIC passed the model with ‘five ‘no’ votes and three states’
abstaining.” (footnote omitted)).
230. Id. at 488.
231. Goldin, supra note 38, at 442.
232. See, e.g., Meyer & DeBofsky, supra note 69; David A. Pratt, Focus On . . . . Attorney’s Fees in ERISA Litigation, 24 J. PENSION BENEFITS 9, 11 (2017).
233. Health Insurance and Managed Care (B) Committee, supra note 134 (noting that
it is difficult to get attorneys to take ERISA benefits cases due to the limited remedial
scheme, lack of damages beyond the benefit itself, and lack of any punitive damages).
234. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1001 § 2719,
124 Stat. 119, 887–88 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19 (2012)); 29 C.F.R. §
2590.715-2719(d)(2)(iii)(A) (2018); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1185d (2012) (incorporating by reference the ACA’s binding external review requirement into ERISA).
235. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2719(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 888.
236. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2719(d)(2)(iii)(A) (2018).
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ERISA-governed plans are treated more leniently and are required to contract with just three IROs and rotating assignments
among them. 237 State-law plans, however, must assign cases randomly, choosing from a list of external reviewers. 238 With only
three contracted IRO, then, the ERISA plan reviewers are repeat
players who may seek to maintain a good business relationship. 239 Lawyers representing plan participants found problems
with ERISA-contracted IROs: IROs “violate[d] URAC standards,
the NAIC Model Act, and the intent of the federal regulations.” 240
One such lawyer stated explicitly that ERISA-contracted IROs
act differently—and worse—than those hired for non-ERISA
plans. 241
Thus, the reasons for banning discretionary clauses in statelaw-governed plans apply with even greater force to ERISA plans.
CONCLUSION
Discretionary clauses in ERISA plans are without any justifiable legal basis and should be banned. Many insurance products
are naturally at risk of moral hazard—the risk that once the participant is insured, he or she (or, in the case of health insurance,
perhaps the physician) will take on excessive risk, which will fall
on the payor. In the case of ERISA-governed health plans, this is
not the case.
ERISA plans already contain significant gate-keeping features,
such as the murky “medical necessity” requirement, 242 sweeping
state law preemption, 243 and the absence of attorney’s fees for all

237. Id. § 2590.715–2719(d)(2)(iii)(2)(2).
238. Id. § 2590.715–2719(c)(2)(viii).
239. Courts agree that such facts could indeed raise a fair inference that the financial
conflict can influence the denial of a plaintiff’s claim. See Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse
Long Term Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856, 859 n.5 (7th Cir. 2009); Maiden v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., No. 3:14-CV-901, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1428, at *5–6 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6,
2016); see also Demer v. IBM Corp. LTD Plan, 835 F.3d 893, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2016).
240. Letter from Jennifer C. Jaff, Esq., Sec’y of Labor, to Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Sec’y
of Labor (Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.scribd.com/document/73353491/Self-funded-PlanIRO-Problems [https://perma.cc/U76B-X59U].
241. Id. (“In every case, [the IRO] has done things that I have never seen them do when
they are contracted by a state to conduct independent reviews.”).
242. Sage, supra note 26, at 629 (noting that medical necessity decisions are “variable”).
243. Id. at 597 n.3.
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but the most egregious cases. 244 Mental health and substance use
claims are particularly vulnerable in this environment, and investigations reveal that those facing mental health and substance
abuse diagnoses simply are not getting the care that is contracted
for and for which they qualify under their benefits.
Without discretionary clauses, court review would serve the
important function of making sure that the outcome was the right
one, not simply the one that can be defended without a “guffaw”
under a lenient standard of review.
To defend the presence of discretionary clauses in employee
benefit plans is to accept that the expedient, litigation-free outcome is more important than the correct outcome. Americans in
employer-sponsored plans deserve better, especially those struggling with mental health and substance abuse problems. The
United States is in an opioid crisis that robs individuals of their
futures and the country of their contributions. Private health
plans are not pulling their weight in paying for treatment, and
they need to do so by removing discretionary clauses and paying
for contracted benefits. A discretionary clause ban would be one
step toward recovery.

244.

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

